Old rivals, new partners: Conflict and cooperation in politics

Competing interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus are being replaced by increased cooperation between Turkey and Russia as Ankara’s emergence as an independent actor, which proved critical in the Russian-Georgian war, has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. While the two countries still have diverging views on some issues – especially the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – observers from both sides agree there is more room for cooperation than competition
Though competing interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus have at times made the Turkey-Russia relationship a rocky one, experts say Ankara’s emergence as an independent political actor has won it admiration in Moscow.

“Russia prefers players with their own independent agenda to those that act according to someone else’s agenda,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs.

Turkey’s attempts to expand its regional role have not always sat well with Russia, however. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow was rankled by Turkey’s rhetoric about “a new Turkic world coming into being, from the Adriatic to the walls of China,” said Volkan Vural, the former Turkish ambassador to Moscow.

During this period, Vural asked for, and received, an unprecedented appointment with the head of the KGB, the Soviets’ notorious intelligence agency, to ease potential tensions arising from Turkey’s early recognition of the independence of ex-Soviet republics, with which it had ethnic affinity.

“I told [the KGB head] that we were not behind the dissolution of the Soviet Union but that it was only natural for Turkey to have relations with the new states in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Vural said. “I assured him that we did not have a secret agenda and that while we would improve our relations with the ex-Soviet republics, we would not do so at the expense of Russian interests.”

According to Vural, “Turkey managed the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union well,” but was not as successful later in fine-tuning its policies toward Central Asia. Turkey’s initial positioning of itself as a “big brother” to the Turkic republics – an attitude that was at times seen as patronizing – backfired. “We did not read properly the realities on the ground,” Vural said.

Turkey was overambitious during this era, Lukyanov said: “Turkey wanted to be the leader of the region but did not have the resources to do so.”

Pressure from ethnic groups in Turkey with Caucasus origins, such as Chechens, Abkhaz and Georgians, led to tensions with Russia, which considered the ex-Soviet republics part of its zone of influence.

The moral and at times material support given by ethnic groups in Turkey to kinsmen seen by Russia as separatists and terrorists angered Moscow, which in turn has refused to recognize the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, as a terrorist organization, as Turkey, the United States and the European Union have done. According to Halil Akıncı, Turkey’s ambassador to Moscow, who finished his mission last week, there is a PKK presence in Russia, but the outlawed group is not conducting significant activity in the country.

The Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region are two more issues on which Ankara and Moscow do not see eye to eye.

After Armenia declared independence in 1991, the long-simmering issue of the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh, largely populated by ethnic Armenians, flared anew. After a protracted war between the two countries, a fight that depopulated districts around Nagorno-Karabakh of nearly 1 million Azeris who remain refugees, the two sides secured a fragile ceasefire in 1994. Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in support of Azerbaijan’s now-ended effort to secure the return of its occupied territory but little has changed in 17 years. Turkey is in solidarity with Baku but has moved in the past two years on a new agreement to reopen its border with Armenia. Russia, meanwhile, maintains strong ties with Armenia.

“We believe there is a linkage between the solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Russia does not accept such a linkage,” said Akıncı.

“It is a fact that if Turkish-Armenian relations normalize, Turkish influence will increase in the Caucasus and Russia’s will decrease. But it would also be wrong to say that Russia would block any solution to Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia might prefer a regional player’s presence to U.S. presence in the Caucasus,” said Lukyanov, comparing Turkey favorably to Georgia in this regard.

“It has been difficult for Russia to deal with Georgia since it acts according to the Americans’ agenda,” he said, adding that the Turkish Parliament first showed its independence from Washington by refusing to let U.S. soldiers use Turkish soil to stage its invasion of Iraq. Then came the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

“Despite the fact that Turkey has in the past contributed to the Georgian military, it followed a very smart and cautious strategy during that war,” Lukyanov said.

Turkey did not allow U.S. warships to enter the Black Sea and it also vetoed the initiative within NATO to send surveillance planes to the region in a show of solidarity with Georgia, both moves that Lukyanov said were appreciated by Russia.

As Turkey fine-tuned its politics in the region, replacing emotional slogans with rational Realpolitik, the two countries have generally reached a point where they can agree to disagree, while allowing economic relations to flourish unaffected by political tensions.

“We bypass issues on which we don’t see eye to eye. We both state our positions,” said Akıncı.

“Turkish-Russian relations are currently at their best,” said Sinan Oğan, the head of the Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis, or Türksam, adding that there was still more room for cooperation.

“Let’s not forget that Russia is not the old Russia. This country is changing too,” said Oğan, who agrees with Lukyanov that Central Asia will gain strategic importance as a realm of struggle between the U.S., Russia and China.

“The main focus of the United States will be Central Asia, because of Iran and China,” Lukyanov said, agreeing with Oğan that Russia and the U.S. will draw closer together against the rising power of China. “In Central Asia, Russia will prefer to side with the U.S. rather than China,” Lukyanov said.

As the world’s axis shifts toward Central Asia, cooperation between the U.S., Turkey and Russia will increase, Oğan said. Though Lukyanov does not believe Turkey currently has a major role to play in Central Asia, he said he could foresee the likelihood of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the Caucasus. Both experts agreed that the political dimension of relations is promising, with more convergence between the two countries on international and regional issues.

“The areas of competition are shrinking while the areas for cooperation are increasing,” Lukyanov said.

Source: Hurriyet Daily News
URL: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=old-rivals-new-partners-conflict-and-cooperation-in-politics-2010-08-11

Posted by admin August 2010

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